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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AFTER THE TRUMP
PRESIDENCY
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN*
ABSTRACT
Teaching Constitutional Law will not, and should not, be the same after the
presidency of Donald Trump. President Trump conducted his presidency in a
manner which disregarded constitutional limits and assaulted basic
constitutional principles. At the most conventional level for Constitutional Law
courses, the Supreme Court generated new doctrinal responses to some of
Trump’s presidential acts. Moreover, Trump’s presidency engaged non-judicial
actors in considering how relatively obscure constitutional barriers operated,
such as the Emoluments and Pardon Clauses, provisions regarding presidential
inability and impeachment, and even segments of the Twelfth Amendment
related to the role of the Senate president during the count of electoral votes and
of the Fourteenth Amendment regarding Insurrection and Rebellion. Those
constitutional texts have traditionally not been part of basic Constitutional Law
courses, but now, at least some should be—not simply for their own significance
but for questions they raise about the Trump presidency and constitutional
interpretation more generally. But in the aftermath of the Trump presidency,
Constitutional Law courses should pay greater attention to identifying and
exploring basic constitutional principles, many of which the Trump presidency
disparaged, and considering the role of norms, conventions, and human
behavior in vindicating those values. Finally, the Trump presidency points to a
need for law schools, consistent with their missions, to expand their public
educational activities regarding foundational constitutional values.

* Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law Emeritus, Saint Louis University School of Law. I am
grateful for very helpful comments on an earlier draft from Nicholas Allard, Bill Araiza, Eric
Berger, and Renee Landers. Some of the ideas presented in Section II draw from “Constitutional
Principle and Constitutional Morality” which I delivered at the Donald J. Sutherland Lecture at
Hofstra University on October 15, 2019. I retired from full-time law school teaching in June 2019,
although I taught basic Constitutional Law courses in the January 2020 semester at Saint Louis
University School of Law and Washington University School of Law. I am grateful to Kathleen
Casey of the Immel Library at Saint Louis University School of Law for some research assistance.
I, of course, alone am responsible for the substantive judgments made.
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INTRODUCTION
Like so much else, teaching Constitutional Law won’t be the same after the
presidency of Donald Trump. At least it shouldn’t be. The election of 2016
brought to power an authoritarian demagogue who repeatedly assaulted
American constitutional democracy in unprecedented ways. “Trump operated
the presidency in ways that defied widely held assumptions about how a
president might use and abuse the powers of the office,” 1 wrote Bob Bauer,
former White House Counsel to President Barack Obama, and Jack Goldsmith,
Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel under President
George W. Bush. The Bauer-Goldsmith bipartisan indictment of Trump echoed
and was subscribed to many times over by other thoughtful constitutionalists
associated with both major parties. Trump’s behavior triggered novel
consideration of dormant constitutional provisions, trashed long-standing
constitutional norms and conventions, and even challenged basic American
constitutional ideals. And the enduring loyalty of his supporters notwithstanding
these assaults raises existential questions for the future of American
constitutional democracy.
Trump’s presidency presents one of several sources which press for change
in the content of basic Constitutional Law courses. Even in normal times,
Constitutional Law is among the most dynamic subjects in the law school
curriculum. Even as canonical cases anchor the basic Constitutional Law
courses, most Supreme Court terms produce some decisions that require syllabus
revisions. The current Court’s composition, calendar, and arguments suggest a
disposition to disrupt long-standing precedent, which may introduce major
decisions with new doctrinal developments or approaches needing coverage.
And traumatic, high-profile events, including the killings of George Floyd and
other persons of color, have reminded this nation of the persistence of structural
racism and other pernicious forms of discrimination against historically
disadvantaged groups, thereby giving constitutional law teachers even more
cause to reconsider the presentation of Constitutional Law. Perhaps some future
volume of this Law Journal’s “Teaching” series might address teaching about
structural racism across the curriculum.
Yet, the fact that curricular revision should also respond to other calls should
not preclude the important, and to some extent overlapping, task of responding
to the issues that Trump’s presidency raises. At the most particular level,
Trump’s conduct presented new issues for constitutional interpretation. In
response to his presidency, the Supreme Court wrote some new doctrine, and
other constitutional interpreters considered and applied obscure, rarely-invoked
constitutional provisions. Trump was sui generis, and accordingly, his

1. BOB BAUER & JACK GOLDSMITH, AFTER TRUMP: RECONSTRUCTING THE PRESIDENCY ix
(2020).
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presidency tested esoteric constitutional backstops not previously part of basic
law school Constitutional Law courses.
Yet, Trump’s presidency did not simply surface some obscure constitutional
provisions to include in the syllabus under familiar categories. In addition,
Trump brushed aside many long-standing norms and conventions that had been
established to implement basic constitutional principles. Many such practices
are not judicially enforced, and accordingly, most Constitutional Law courses
probably allow them cameo appearances, if that. Still their connection to
constitutional values and procedures and their centrality to constitutional
government, as demonstrated by the fallout from Trump’s behavior, invite
Constitutional Law teachers to reconsider their role in the course.
The anomalous nature of the questions and clauses Trump brought into play
and his disparagement of familiar norms signaled that his presidency
inaugurated a critical moment for American constitutional democracy. It
assaulted foundational American constitutional ideals, principles that animate
the document and our best constitutional traditions. That Trump’s presidency
rejected basic constitutional ideals was most dramatically illustrated by the
unwillingness of Trump and many of his supporters to acknowledge his clear
defeat in 2020 and by their effort to retain power through extra-legal methods,
behavior characteristic of autocratic regimes but foreign to American
experience. The Trump-inspired events made January 6 a day of infamy,
different from, but which will stand alongside, December 7 and September 11.
However, that day’s attack on constitutional institutions and the Capitol came
from within, and the “insurrection” and “terrorism” it represented was inspired
not by America’s external enemies, but by Trump’s words and those of some of
his close allies. 2
Nevertheless, curricular revision seems an inadequate response for law
schools to this assault on basic principles of American constitutional democracy.
What was most striking, unsettling, and indeed frightening about the Trump
presidency was that he achieved and retained widespread support,
notwithstanding his assault on bedrock American constitutional ideals.
American law schools have a stake in preserving constitutional principles, and
Trump’s ability to sustain considerable public support notwithstanding the
events of January 6 makes clear that many Americans do not understand or
2. See, e.g., 167 CONG. REC. S735 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2021) (statement of Sen. Mitch
McConnell) (stating that mob on January 6, 2021, used “terrorism” because President Trump fed
them “wild falsehoods”); id. at S738 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2021) (statement of Sen. Susan Collins)
(stating that Trump “incited an insurrection with the purpose of preventing that transfer of power
from occurring.”); id. at S26 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Sen. Mitt Romney) (calling
events at Capitol on January 6, 2021, “an insurrection incited by [Trump]”); Statement by President
George W. Bush on Insurrection at the Capitol, GEORGE W. BUSH PRESIDENTIAL CTR. (Jan. 6,
2021) (referring to January 6, 2021, as an “insurrection” conducted “by people whose passions
have been inflamed by falsehoods and false hopes.”).
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embrace basic ideals of the American constitutional system. That interest
justifies educational activities that extend beyond students in Constitutional Law
courses and mandates efforts to help educate the public about those basic ideals.
Law schools should consider expanding curricular and extra-curricular
opportunities for faculty and students to help educate others regarding American
constitutional principles in a manner consistent with their mission.
This Essay continues in Section I by outlining some of the specific
constitutional issues Trump’s presidency raised which merit discussion in basic
Constitutional Law courses. Section II argues that the Trump presidency
assaulted foundational constitutional principles and illustrates that point by
focusing on two such principles implicated by Trump’s activities culminating in
the January 6 insurrection. It also underscores a truth most of us have taken for
granted, but which Trump’s presidency shows deserves more emphasis in
Constitutional Law courses, that the survival of basic constitutional ideals,
indeed of American constitutional government, depends on the willingness of
government officials and citizens to follow principle, even when doing so cuts
against their immediate partisan preferences. The message of Section II deserves
a larger audience than those who study Constitutional Law in law school.
Accordingly, Section III suggests that law schools have an interest in and
standing to educate more broadly regarding basic constitutional ideals.
Two disclosures may be useful in assessing my suggestions. First, since
course design should serve curricular objectives, a word about my understanding
of the purpose of basic law school Constitutional Law courses seems
appropriate. Although most students will not practice constitutional law, some
will, a larger group will occasionally find (or miss) a constitutional issue relevant
to a client’s problem, and virtually all will benefit in their practices from basic
knowledge of the structure and purposes of American government. 3 Moreover,
lawyers often assume civic roles in which their performance can benefit from
exposure to Constitutional Law. 4 Indeed, some argue that the primary
justification for requiring students to take Constitutional Law is better to prepare
them to be “leading citizens.” 5 As such, basic Constitutional Law courses should
educate students regarding constitutional structure and rights and the purposes
behind such arrangements and provisions; the way lawyers, judges, and other
officials make constitutional arguments and the strengths and weaknesses of
different approaches to constitutional interpretation; the role of judges, other
3. Ernest A. Young, Curricula and Complacency: A Response to Professor Levinson, 117
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 12 (2008) (contending that knowledge of constitutional structure benefits
lawyers in their practices).
4. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Teaching the Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment and the
Constitution of Memory, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 639, 641 (2018) (suggesting that some law students
will play an important role in civic society lending importance to constitutional law courses).
5. Sanford G. Levinson, Reconsidering the Syllabus in “Constitutional Law,” 117 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 8 (2008).
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officials, lawyers, and citizens in making and applying constitutional law; and
the fundamental ideals implicit in our constitutional system.
Second, having retired from full-time teaching in June 2019 and having last
taught basic Constitutional Law courses the following January 2020 semester, I
may not experience the syllabus and classroom challenges my recommendations
will present. My last courses included some of the material discussed in Section
I and some ideas in Section II below, but the concerns and suggestions in
Sections II and III have grown and been influenced by the events of January 6,
2021, and its aftermath. Yet, my suggestions are not disciplined by the
knowledge that I will have to practice in class or in faculty committee work what
I preach in these pages. Nonetheless, the novelty of some of the issues raised
and the severity of the threat posed to basic constitutional principles convinces
me of the curricular and institutional merit of the suggestions made here.
I. CASES & CLAUSES
Most Constitutional Law courses focus on doctrine from Supreme Court
decisions and the textual provisions at issue in those disputes. Accordingly, a
natural, or at least comfortable, place to begin considering the impact of Trump’s
presidency on Constitutional Law courses are some Supreme Court cases
associated with his presidency and the constitutional clauses that his behavior
brought into frequent discussion. What follows is not a comprehensive list of
those cases and clauses but some of those which are suggestive and may merit
attention. 6
A.

Trump & the Supreme Court
1.

The Muslim Ban: Korematsu Revisited

Courses on constitutional rights typically include Korematsu v. United
States, 7 the infamous decision in which the Supreme Court upheld military
orders confining Japanese American citizens to specified areas during World
War II. Korematsu was subsequently viewed as a colossal embarrassment of
American history, 8 and few, if any, expected behavior of a 21st century

6. For instance, I do not discuss claims in some litigation, such as Trump’s attempt to invoke
executive privilege against records requests made of the United States Archivist by the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol. See Trump v.
Thompson, 20 F4th 10, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1350 (2022).
7. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 214 (1944).
8. Harold Hongju Koh, Symposium: Trump v. Hawaii — Korematsu’s ghost and nationalsecurity masquerades, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2018/06/symposium-trump-v-hawaii-korematsus-ghost-and-national-security-masquerades/
(asserting that “Korematsu was overruled in the court of public opinion … decades” before Court’s
decision in Trump v. Hawaii). See also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (expressing
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American presidential candidate or president to cause reasonable people to
compare their conduct to that of the federal government in the 1940s in creating
and defending Japanese internment camps as a wartime expedient. Nevertheless,
Trump’s campaign rhetoric and earliest actions as president presented an
analogy to Korematsu. Trump was widely-criticized, even by fellow
Republicans, 9 for his statement on December 7, 2015, the 74th anniversary of
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, calling for “a total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure
out what is going on.” 10 Trump justified his campaign policy of banning
Muslim’s from entering the United States by pointing to Roosevelt’s actions
following Pearl Harbor. 11 Even for those who do not regard Trump as an
authority on the Constitution or American history, his reliance on F.D.R.’s wartime orders to support his policy made the association with Korematsu
inescapable.
In Trump v. Hawaii, 12 the Supreme Court considered questions of
presidential power and religious liberty after Trump issued executive orders
suspending entry of foreign nationals from certain (mostly Muslim) countries,
while the Department of Homeland Security reviewed the adequacy of the
information those countries provided to allow a determination regarding whether
those individuals presented a security threat. 13 After lower courts held Trump’s
initial order unlawful, Trump issued new orders twice in eight months, varying
the affected countries, rationale, nature of the review undertaken, and
procedures. 14 As a candidate, president-elect, and president, Trump repeatedly
made comments hostile to Muslims. 15 Nonetheless, the Court, in a 5–4 decision,
upheld Trump’s third order against a constitutional challenge that it violated the
Establishment Clause by discriminating against Muslims. 16
“what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled
in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law under the Constitution.’”).
9. Jessica Taylor, Trump Calls for a ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering’
U.S., NPR (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/12/07/458836388/trump-calls-for-total-andcomplete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-u-s (quoting comments of Governors Jeb Bush and Chris
Christie and Senators Lindsay Graham and Marco Rubio denouncing Trump’s statement).
10. Id.
11. Meghan Keneally, Donald Trump Cites These FDR Policies to Defend Muslim Ban, ABC
NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-cites-fdr-policies-defendmuslim-ban/story?id=35648128.
12. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
13. Id. at 2403.
14. Id. at 2403–04.
15. See, e.g., id. at 2417 (summarizing Trump’s statements calling for “total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” referring to “Muslim ban”). See also id. at 2435–
38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (providing a more complete statement of Trump’s anti-Muslim
comments).
16. Id. at 2423.
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The majority opinion, which Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote,
characterized Trump’s third order as facially neutral and one which addressed a
matter within the “core of executive responsibility” 17 and reasoned that courts
typically were very deferential to presidential actions regarding whether to admit
foreign nationals given national security implications. The issue was not whether
to denounce Trump’s statements, the Court wrote, but to determine the
significance of those statements in assessing the third order. The Court applied
a deferential standard of review to facially neutral provisions in entry cases, 18
and it found that the lenient test of some legitimate national security basis was
met in this case by the articulated purpose of “preventing entry of nationals who
cannot be adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve their
practices.” 19 The Court, in part, cited the facts that the policy did not specifically
identify a religion, and affected countries with only eight percent of the world’s
Muslims and which prior administrations and Congress had designated as posing
national security concerns. 20
In dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor found the majority’s summary of
Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric incomplete. She catalogued Trump’s statements
which demonstrated his anti-Muslim animus in greater detail than the majority
had and concluded that the “full record paints a far more harrowing picture, from
which a reasonable observer would readily conclude that the Proclamation was
motivated by hostility and animus toward the Muslim faith.” 21 Given Trump’s
pronouncements, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent found “stark parallels between the
[majority’s] reasoning” and Korematsu. 22 The majority forcefully rejected that
analogy, characterizing the government order upheld in Korematsu as one which
forcibly relocated “U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on
the basis of race.” 23
Yet, the majority’s dismissal of Korematsu as having “nothing to do with
this case” 24 seems at least an overstatement and more likely raises inferences
appropriately drawn in response to excessive protestation. Even if distinctions
can fairly be made since, for instance, Trump’s orders excluded certain foreign
nationals rather than confining American citizens, those variations did not
eliminate the resemblance between the “reasoning” in the two cases, which was,
after all, the point Justice Sotomayor made. In both cases, Harold Hongju Koh
pointed out,

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018).
Id. at 2418–21.
Id. at 2420–21.
Id. at 2421.
Id. at 2435.
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2447 (2018).
Id. at 2423.
Id.
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[T]he president had invoked an amorphous national security threat to justify a
sweeping discriminatory policy limiting the freedom of a particular group. In
both cases, the government asserted a grossly overbroad group stereotype that
presumed that membership in that group, standing alone, signaled a hidden
desire to harm the United States. 25

And the fact that the targeted category in both cases was a minority group subject
to prejudice made the parallels more obvious.
And still, even as the Court upheld Trump’s third order, it went to lengths
to distance itself, and the Constitution, from Trump’s rhetoric. Chief Justice
Roberts used the case “to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was
gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history”
and was inconsistent with the Constitution. 26 That judicial pronouncement will
forever link Trump v. Hawaii to Korematsu in ironic contradiction of the Chief
Justice’s earlier statement separating the two cases. Moreover, the majority went
out of its way to point out that the president “possesses an extraordinary power
to speak to his fellow citizens and on their behalf” and to articulate inclusive
themes, an implicit criticism of Trump’s rhetoric. 27 Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy was more explicit in his concurrence. He instructed that “the very fact
that an official may have broad discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny,
makes it all the more imperative for him or her to adhere to the Constitution and
to its meaning and its promise.” 28 And he recognized “an urgent necessity that
officials adhere to these constitutional guarantees and mandates [in the First
Amendment’s religion clauses] in all their actions, even in the sphere of foreign
affairs.” 29 Those admonitions would not have been necessary had the
pronouncements of candidate and President Trump sounded inclusive themes.
2.

The President’s Amenability to Legal Process

Trump’s conduct also gave the Supreme Court occasion to reaffirm and
broaden doctrine regarding the president’s obligation to comply with judicial
process concerning their private conduct in a pair of cases. As will be seen
25. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 201
(2019).
26. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
27. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417–18 (2018).
28. Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
29. Id. The Court’s opinion left questions regarding handling of future cases involving
allegations of bad governmental motive. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriquez, Trump v. Hawaii and the
Future of Presidential Power Over Immigration, https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-supremecourt-review/trump-v-hawaii-and-the-future-of-presidential-power-over-immigration/; First
Amendment — Establishment Clause — Judicial Review of Pretext — Trump v. Hawaii, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 327 (2018). See also Marty Lederman, Contrary to Popular Belief, the Court Did Not Hold
that Travel Ban is Lawful—Anything But, JUST SEC. (July 2, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/
58807/contrary-popular-belief-court-hold-travel-ban-lawful-anything-but-which-ruling-justicekennedys-deference-presidents-enforcement-ban-indefensible/.
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below, a committee of the House of Representatives sought Trump’s tax returns
to aid in its legislative work, and a New York grand jury issued a subpoena duces
tecum to third party banks and accounting firms for the returns incident to a
criminal investigation. Trump sought to quash the subpoenas.
Trump v. Vance, 30 which considered whether Trump’s tax returns were
subject to state judicial process, contributed to doctrine from earlier cases
regarding the amenability of a president to the rule of law in criminal 31 and civil
cases. 32 In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court rejected Trump’s claim
of immunity from a state-issue subpoena duces tecum regarding a grand jury
investigation into possible criminal conduct of his companies. After citing and
reaffirming long-standing practice to the contrary regarding federal
prosecutions, 33 the Court unanimously concluded that the president lacked
immunity from state process, 34 and a majority rejected Trump’s alternative
claim that a state grand jury subpoena for a president’s private papers was
subject to a higher standard. 35
In Trump v. Mazars, 36 the Court considered whether Congress had power to
subpoena Trump’s tax records. 37 The Court’s review of American history
disclosed a longstanding tradition of the two political branches, resolving prior
such disputes without litigation. 38 The Court concluded that Congress has power
to subpoena records for a valid “legislative purpose” but not simply for law
enforcement purposes, subject to the constitutional rights of recipients. 39 The
Court rejected Trump’s claim that Congress must show a “demonstrated specific
need” for access to a president’s private papers as it would for materials covered
by executive privilege, 40 but also rejected the House’s proposed standard, which
would treat subpoenas directed to the president like those to anyone else and

30. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding president subject to
subpoenas in criminal case notwithstanding executive privilege); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
30, 38 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, Cir. J.) (holding President Jefferson subject to
judicial subpoena in criminal case against former Vice President Aaron Burr). For an interesting
discussion of the different role the Court played in the Nixon and Trump cases, see Josh Chafetz,
Nixon/Trump: Strategies of Judicial Aggrandizement, 110 GEO. L.J. 125 (2021).
32. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705 (1997); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 758 (1982).
33. Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2421–24.
34. Id. at 2429 (describing agreement of dissenting justices with this holding); id. at 2431
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (stating agreement of Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch that president
lacks absolute immunity from state criminal process).
35. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2429–30 (2020).
36. Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020).
37. Id. at 2026.
38. Id. at 2029–31.
39. Id. at 2431–32.
40. Id. at 2432–33.
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would raise separation of powers concerns. 41 Instead, the Court prescribed a
multi-factor test to balance the various separation of powers concerns at stake. 42
3.

The Electoral College: Faithless Electors

Unlike the Trump cases discussed above, the Faithless Elector cases 43 did
not involve constitutional issues Trump’s misbehavior triggered, but assessed
the constitutionality of the conduct of others. Notwithstanding this difference,
they are included because of their connection to Trump’s presidency, because
the anomalous conduct that gave rise to them was predicated on a perception
regarding Trump’s unfitness for office, and because they raise important issues.
Although Trump received nearly three million votes fewer than his 2016
rival, former Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton, he was elected because he
secured an electoral vote majority. 44 Trump’s election focused attention once
again on a problematic feature of American democracy, the election of the
president by the electoral college rather than through popular vote. Although
virtually all presidents have won the most popular votes as well as an electoral
vote majority, candidates who lost the popular vote were elected in two (2000,
2016) of the last six elections, and a small change of popular votes in a few states
could have flipped the outcome of two other recent presidential elections (2004,
2020), notwithstanding the sizeable popular vote margins for the winners
(George W. Bush, Joe Biden) of those two contests. 45
The potential perils of the electoral college extend beyond the possibility
that the popular vote winner may not become president. Although the political
parties choose electors and presumably select loyal partisans likely to be faithful,
the Constitution does not require electors to support the candidates who won
their state. In fact, electors were initially supposed to exercise discretion, a
practice that largely disappeared as political parties developed and assumed
control of elector selection. Some states statutorily require electors to support
their state’s popular vote winner. 46 In 2016, Clinton electors in some states
violated their pledges to vote for the former Secretary of State and instead

41. Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2433–35 (2020).
42. Id. at 2435–36.
43. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020); Colorado Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S.
Ct. 2316 (2020) (per curiam).
44. KAREN L. HAAS, OFF. OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REP., STATISTICS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION: NOVEMBER 8, 2016 83–84 (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/2016election/.
45. See generally, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF REP., ELECTION STATISTICS:
1920 TO PRESENT, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/Election-Statistics/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2022).
46. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2321 (stating that thirty-two states and Washington D.C. had laws
requiring electors to pledge to support the candidate they were elected to support); id. at 2322
(reporting that fifteen states sanction pledge violations).
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supported other candidates. Their action was not a rejection of Clinton, but an
effort to try to induce similar behavior from enough Trump electors to allow an
alternative to a Trump presidency. 47 The effort failed yet it raised the specter of
other abuses from unfaithful electors. Suppose a deep-pocketed, yet
unscrupulous, politician or other person used bribes or threats to corrupt the
electoral vote by trying to induce switches? In two related cases, 48 the Supreme
Court unanimously held that states had power to penalize or prevent electors
from deviating from the candidate they had pledged to support. Although the
Constitution did not speak to whether states could sanction electors who violated
pledges, long-standing practice supported such measures.
The cases focused attention on the use of the electoral college to decide
presidential elections notwithstanding its anti-democratic character and the fact
that it increasingly raises the possibility that the president and vice president will
come from a party which received fewer popular votes. The case draws attention
to the way some constitutional institutions, like the electoral college, operate in
ways far different from intended, highlights the role of states in determining
presidential elections, and demonstrates reliance on ongoing practice as a mode
of constitutional analysis. The electoral college also offers a window into
imperfections in the Constitution and the constitutional and political
impediments to reform. 49 During the 1960s, some thought that the next election
of a popular vote loser would produce a sufficient backlash to abolish the
electoral college, but more recent experience has shown that expectation
misguided since the beneficiaries tend to become more wedded to the institution
that allows them to prevail.
4.

Trump & the Constitution Outside the Court

Most constitutional issues Trump’s presidency raised did not produce
Supreme Court decisions on the merits. Sometimes, the Court dismissed the
claims on justiciability grounds or failed to grant certiorari. 50 Often, Trump’s
behavior required non-judicial officials to engage in constitutional interpretation
47. Id. at 2322.
48. Id. at 2320 (Court, 9–0, upholds Washington law fining electors who violate pledges);
Colorado Dep’t of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (Court, 8–0, with Justice Sotomayor
recused, upholds Colorado law replacing electors who act contrary to pledge).
49. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006); LARRY J.
SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION: WHY THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE REVISED: IDEAS
TO INSPIRE A NEW GENERATION (2007).
50. See, e.g., Trump v. New York, 131 S. Ct. 530 (2020) (dismissing on standing and ripeness
grounds challenge to Trump order to exclude from census apportionment base aliens not in lawfully
documented status); Bognet v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 2508 (2021) (granting certiorari but
vacating judgment and instructing lower court to dismiss case as moot): Blumenthal v. Trump, 949
F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir, 2020), cert. den., 141 S. Ct. 553 (2020) (denying certiorari on lower court
dismissal of foreign emoluments challenge for lack of standing).
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relating to presidential power, thereby affording examples of constitutional
interpretation outside the judiciary.
The instances typically involved obscure constitutional texts that
traditionally have not been part of Constitutional Law courses. The unique
nature of these issues meant that they were beyond the expertise of most law
professors who generally had never previously researched, taught, or perhaps
even read the constitutional texts involved. 51 More importantly, the recourse to
constitutional limits and procedures that are almost never tested or used was
instructive regarding the deviant nature of the Trump presidency and his
willingness to abuse constitutional power and norms in novel ways.
a.

Emoluments

For instance, Trump’s behavior as president regarding his vast business
holdings focused attention on the Constitution’s Emoluments clauses. Whereas
the Foreign Emoluments Clause precludes various office-holders from
accepting, absent congressional consent, “emoluments” from foreign
countries, 52 the Domestic Emoluments Clause prohibits the president from
receiving any “emolument” from the United States or any state. 53 The two
provisions have different sweeps, 54 yet both reflect the Constitution’s effort to
prevent governmental corruption and undue deference of covered officials to
certain actors. The Foreign Emoluments Clause is among the constitutional
provisions, seemingly directed at preventing foreign governments from
achieving undue influence over American decision-making. Cases brought by
various plaintiffs asserted violations of one or the other Emoluments clauses
based on foreign officials patronizing Trump’s hotels, Trump’s businesses
receipt of foreign licensing fees, and Trump’s rental of governmental property. 55
Following Biden’s inauguration, the Court directed some of the cases dismissed
as moot and denied certiorari on one the appellate court had dismissed on
standing. 56
51. Joel K. Goldstein, Talking Trump and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Correcting the
Record on Section 4, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 73, 76–78 (2018) (discussing numerous instances where
leading scholars misconstrue aspects of Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment due to
unfamiliarity with it).
52. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“and No Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, Office, or Title
of any kind whatever from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”).
53. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“and [the president] shall not receive . . . any other
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”).
54. BAUER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 51–52 (explaining that the Constitution does not
explicitly subject the president to the Foreign Emoluments Clause although Congress has presumed
in legislation that he or she is so subject).
55. THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSES OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (2021),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11086.pdf.
56. Id.
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Amenability to Criminal Prosecution

The president’s amenability to criminal prosecution again became an issue
during the Trump presidency. Trump’s action in firing FBI Director James
Comey, whose agency was overseeing an investigation of concerns regarding
Russia’s interference with the 2016 election to benefit Trump, resulted in the
appointment of Robert Mueller, a widely respected former Deputy Attorney
General and FBI Director, as a special counsel. Mueller was appointed to
conduct a counterintelligence investigation regarding links between the Russian
government and the Trump campaign and matters arising from that
investigation. Mueller’s investigation discussed multiple instances of Trump’s
behavior that potentially constituted obstruction of justice, but did not make a
decision to prosecute or not prosecute Trump so as “not to apply an approach
that could potentially result in a judgment that [Trump] committed crimes” as
president since, under DOJ regulations, Trump could not be prosecuted until he
left office. Mueller reasoned that a statement asserting Trump had committed
crimes would be unfair to him since he would lack an adversarial forum in which
to contest the special counsel’s conclusion of his guilt. 57 Mueller’s Report stated
that the special counsel would exonerate Trump if a thorough investigation left
him confident that Trump did not obstruct justice but that the Special Counsel
was unable to determine “conclusively” that no criminal conduct occurred, and
accordingly the report did not exonerate Trump. 58
The Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice had concluded
during the Nixon 59 and Clinton 60 administrations that the president could not be
prosecuted while in office. Was that the correct conclusion? Although the
Constitution states that someone “convicted” of impeachment “shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law,” 61 that provision seems designed to negate an
impeached party’s claim of a Double Jeopardy defense to criminal
prosecution, 62 not to dictate that impeachment and removal must precede

57. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2 (2019).
58. Id. at 2, 8, 182. Attorney General William Barr determined that Trump had not committed
an obstruction of justice offense. See Letter from William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., to Lindsay Graham,
Dianne Feinstein, Jerrold Nadler, Doug Collins, U.S. Sen. (Mar. 24, 2019).
59. Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr. on Amenability of the President, Vice President,
and Other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office (Sept. 24, 1973) (on file
with Department of Justice at https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/092473.pdf).
60. A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C.
222, 237 (2000).
61. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
62. U.S. CONST., amend. V (“nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb.”).
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criminal process. 63 The Impeachment Judgment Clause 64 applies to any officer
subject to impeachment, not just the president, and other officers, including the
vice president, are subject to criminal prosecution while in office. 65 The special
immunity for the president instead rests upon his or her uniqueness. 66 Yet, does
that privileged status place the president outside the rule of law?
c.

Impeachment/Removal & Incapacity

The Constitution includes two different ways to separate a president
involuntarily from presidential powers and duties before the four-year term
expires, presidential impeachment and removal, 67 and transfer of presidential
powers and duties to the vice president under Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. 68 Both drastic procedures achieved an unusual degree of
prominence during the Trump presidency. The first applies to a president who
has committed “treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors,” 69 and
the second to one who is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office.” 70 The two provisions allocate decision-making authority quite
differently, reflecting disparate visions of the appropriate way to handle the
different determinations. Impeachment and removal are committed to Congress,
with the House of Representatives possessing the sole power to impeach (by
majority vote), 71 and the Senate being given the sole power to try impeachments
and convict the president by a two-thirds adverse vote. 72 By contrast, highranking officials of the executive branch (i.e., the vice president and a majority
of the “principal officers of the executive departments”) must initiate Section 4,
and Congress participates only to resolve an intra-executive branch dispute

63. BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS
ENEMIES 26 (2012) (labeling the textual argument as “specious” since intended to
negate Double Jeopardy defense).
64. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
65. See, e.g., KALT, supra note 63, at 26.
66. See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op.
O.L.C. 222, 236, 246, 247 (2000).
67. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
68. U.S. CONST., amend. XXV, § 4.
69. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4.
70. U.S. CONST., amend. XXV, § 4.
71. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power
of Impeachment.”).
72. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no Person shall be
convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.”).
AND THEIR
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regarding the president’s capacity. 73 Impeachment-removal and Section 4 also
have different legal consequences. Although both transfer presidential powers
and duties to the vice president, impeachment and removal terminates a
presidency whereas Section 4 leaves the president in office with the possibility
of resuming his or her presidential powers and duties once the inability ends. 74
Section 4 simply transfers presidential powers and duties to the vice presidency
for the duration of the inability.
Significantly, both procedures are constitutional anomalies. Only two
presidential impeachment trials occurred during America’s first forty-four
presidencies, covering fifty-seven presidential terms and 228 years from 1789
to 2017;75 a third president, Richard M. Nixon, would have been impeached and
convicted but resigned to avoid those indignities. 76 And, not only had Section 4
never been invoked in the roughly half century since it became part of the
Constitution, prior to Trump’s presidency it had rarely, and then only briefly,
even been considered or discussed. 77
Trump’s four-year term changed all of that. The number of presidential
impeachment trials doubled during Trump’s single term. Whereas Trump’s
predecessors experienced only one impeachment trial every twenty-two
presidencies or every 28.5 presidential terms, Trump’s single term produced two
impeachment trials! He was impeached by the House of Representatives on
December 18, 2019, for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress relating to
his action withholding foreign aid to Ukraine to pressure its president to do him
“a favor” by announcing an investigation of former Vice President Joe Biden
and his son to help Trump in his presidential campaign. 78 He was impeached
again on January 13, 2021, for encouraging an insurrection to disrupt Congress

73. Section 4 does allow Congress, through normal legislative process, to replace the
“principal officers of the executive departments” with an “other body” to act with the vice president.
Congress has never done so.
74. See Goldstein, supra note 51, at 121–24.
75. HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF REP., LIST OF INDIVIDUALS IMPEACHED BY
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Impeachment/Impeach
ment-List/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2022).
76. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, A Formidable Weapon of Faction?: The Law and Politics
of Impeachment, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 381, 393 (2020) (stating that Nixon resigned when his
political support collapsed making his impeachment and conviction inevitable); Joel K. Goldstein,
The Senate, The Trump Impeachment Trial and Constitutional Morality, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
475, 493–94 (2020) (same).
77. Its use was considered, but rejected, when President Ronald Reagan was shot on March
30, 1981, and again when former Senate majority leader Howard Baker became Reagan’s third
chief of staff in February 1987. See JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS
COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS 273 (3d ed. 2014); Goldstein, supra note 51, at 79.
78. 165 CONG. REC. H12205-06 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2019).
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from fulfilling its constitutional duty to count the electoral votes which would
establish his defeat. 79
The Trump impeachments raise various constitutional questions, some more
serious than others: What constitutes an “other high crime or misdemeanor” for
which a president may be impeached and convicted? 80 May a president or other
civil officer be tried after he or she has left office? 81 Does impeachment and
removal of a first-term president inappropriately interfere with the electorate’s
prerogatives in a democracy? Should a president be impeached when the Senate
clearly will not convict him or her? 82 What responsibility do Senators have in
considering a presidential impeachment? 83 To what extent can an impeachment
proceeding serve as a means of establishing or vindicating constitutional
norms? 84
Section 4 was not invoked but it became the subject of repeated and
continuous discussion, not simply from pundits and scholars, but from members

79. 167 CONG. REC. H191 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2021).
80. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting the Law of Impeachment in Perspective, 43 ST
LOUIS. U. L. J. 905, 913–19 (1999) (concluding that phrase was not limited to indictable crimes);
Richard J. Pious, Impeaching the President: The Intersection of Constitutional and Popular Law,
43 ST. LOUIS. U. L. J. 859, 866–78 (1999) (discussing question historically and in context of Clinton
impeachment).
81. See, generally, KALT, supra note 63, at 106–32 (discussing issue generally); THE
IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF A FORMER PRESIDENT, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (2021), https://crs
reports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10565. Compare Keith E. Whittington, Can a Former
President Be Impeached and Convicted?, LAWFARE (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com
/can-former-president-be-impeached-and-convicted (arguing yes) with Harold J. Krent, Can
President Trump be Impeached as Mr. Trump? Exploring the Temporal Dimension of
Impeachment, 95 CHI-KENT L. REV. 537 (2020) (arguing that “Congress can only initiate
impeachment when an officer is in office”).
82. See, e.g., Keith Whittington, The Role of Norms in Our Constitutional Order, 44 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 23–24 (2021) (discussing whether impeachment should precede absent
bipartisan support).
83. See Goldstein, supra note 76.
84. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 76, at 401–02 (discussing use of impeachment for these
normative purposes).
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of Trump’s own administration 85 and party. 86 The constitutional procedure was
frequently misunderstood, even by academics and constitutional law teachers. 87
Although, whether Trump was able was discussed at various times during his
presidency, the most serious consideration occurred after Trump’s
unprecedented behavior on January 6, 2021, where he encouraged his partisans
to disrupt the electoral vote count, and after his prolonged failure to act to protect
the constitutional procedure and the officials engaged in conducting it. 88
Whether Trump was “unable” as Section 4 contemplated was committed
initially to the vice president and Cabinet. In response to Trump’s behavior on
January 6, a number of long-time Trump associates resigned. 89
d.

The Pardon Power

The president’s pardon power generally receives little attention, perhaps
because most presidents follow guidelines that circumscribe its use and treat it
as a power for public purposes, not personal benefit. President George W. Bush,
for instance, resisted enormous pressure from Vice President Dick Cheney and
others and, as his administration ended, refused to pardon I. Lewis “Scooter”
Libby, Cheney’s chief of staff and a high-ranking Bush aide, because he
concluded that Libby’s petition did not meet Department of Justice standards. 90
85. See, e.g., Michael Stratford, Devos Resigned After Believing 25th Amendment was off the
Table, POLITICO (Jan. 8, 2017), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/08/devos-resignationtrump-rioters-456574; Devan Cole, Trump’s ex-White House Chief of Staff John Kelly Supports
Using 25th Amendment to Remove the President, CNN (Jan. 7, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2021/
01/07/politics/john-kelly-trump-25th-amendment-capitol-riot-cnntv/index.html; Adam Goldman
& Michael S. Schmidt, Rod Rosenstein Suggested Secretly Recording Trump and Discussed 25th
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2018, at A13; Moses Taylor, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside
the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/
opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-resistance.html (Chief of Staff at Homeland Security
department describing “early whispers” in Trump Cabinet regarding Section 4 based on Trump’s
“instability” and “erratic” behavior); Sharon LaFraniere, New Book Details Tumult That Led to
Russia Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2019, at A20 (reporting that Deputy Attorney General Rod J.
Rosenstein discussed possibility of invoking Section 4 to declare Trump unable and said Attorney
General Jeff Sessions and Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly would support that action).
86. Michael Warren et al., Angry Republican Leaders Float Removing Trump from Office,
CNN (Jan. 7, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/06/politics/trump-capitol-impeachment-25amendment/index.html.
87. Goldstein, supra note 51 (discussing mistakes in writings about Section 4 by scholars and
reporters).
88. See, e.g., Mychael Schnell, Mnuchin, Pompeo Mulled Plan to Remove Trump After Jan 6:
Book, HILL (Nov. 16, 2021), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/581688-mnuchin-pom
peo-mulled-plan-to-use-25th-amendment-to-remove-trump/; see also Joel K. Goldstein, What You
Need to Know About the 25th Amendment, Section 4, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/08/what-you-need-know-about-25th-amendment-section-4/.
89. The Trump Administration Officials Who Resigned Over Capitol Violence, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-resignations.html.
90. GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 103–05 (2010).
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Trump, however, used the pardon power frequently to benefit political and
personal associates, including his campaign manager Paul Manafort, associate
Roger Stone, Jr., and high-ranking White House Aides Michael Flynn and
Stephen K. Bannon, among others, 91 and seemed disposed to pardon himself and
various family members. 92 Bauer and Goldsmith write that “no other president
has, like Trump, used pardons systematically to serve political and personal
goals.” 93 The text of the Constitution, of course, says that the president “shall
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons from Offenses against the United
States.” 94 It does not explicitly preclude the president from a “self-pardon,” but,
as any constitutional interpreter knows, the Constitution does not explicitly state
all of the limits it imposes. 95 Some are discerned from reading clauses within the
context of the entire document 96 or in concert with common sense or other
constitutional principles. 97 Self-pardons seem to conflict with the principle
against self-judging 98 and elevate the president above the law.
e.

Counting the Electoral Votes

America’s presidential elections have almost always been resolved with the
defeated candidate and party recognizing reality, accepting the adverse outcome,
and acting to unify the nation. In 1961, Vice President Richard M. Nixon
announced the election of his rivals in a high-minded statement. 99 Forty years

91. Nina Totenberg, Can Trump Pardon Himself?, NPR (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.npr
.org/2021/01/09/955087860/can-trump-pardon-himself (citing academic study showing late in
Trump’s presidency more than ninety percent of Trump’s pardons to date benefitted personal or
political associates); Here Are Some of the People Trump Pardoned, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/who-did-trump-pardon.html (listing those Trump pardoned).
92. Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump is Said to Have Discussed Pardoning
Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2021, at A13.
93. BAUER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 111.
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
95. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–77 (1803) (articulating the judiciary’s
power of judicial review).
96. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 6 (2012) (stating that “no
clause . . . exists in textual isolation” but that the document must be read “as a whole.”); KALT,
supra note 63, at 47 (stating that limits on pardon power must be found in entire Constitution, not
just in Pardon Clause).
97. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment
Trial? A Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 849, 865–66 (2000) (arguing that
constitutional principles would preclude vice president from so presiding notwithstanding text).
98. See KALT, supra note 63, at 50 (discussing self-judging issue but not reaching definitive
conclusion).
99. 107 CONG. REC. 287 (1961) (statement of Vice President Richard Nixon) (“I do not think
we could have a more striking and eloquent example of the stability of our Constitutional system
and of the proud tradition of the American people of developing, respecting and honoring
institutions of self-government. In our campaigns, no matter how hard-fought they may be, no
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later, Vice President Al Gore magnanimously accepted 100 the adverse Supreme
Court opinion terminating the Florida recount, 101 and in presiding over the
electoral count, repeatedly held out of order Democratic members of the House
of Representatives who raised challenges to the Florida electoral votes as
contrary to the rules. 102 Similarly, in 2017, outgoing Vice President Joe Biden
strictly complied with the rules in presiding over the electoral count, refusing to
entertain challenges to Trump’s electoral votes because not made in compliance
with law. 103
Trump’s behavior could not have been more different. By contrast to
Nixon’s and Gore’s gracious patriotism, as will be discussed later, Trump
encouraged other office-holders to ignore their legal duties, and his actions
encouraged insurrection.
Congress has limited discretion in counting electoral votes, 104 and virtually
everyone has recognized the entirely formal and ceremonial role the President
of the Senate plays in presiding over the proceedings—everyone but Trump and
a handful of his partisans. Prior to the January 6, 2021, session to count the
electoral votes, Trump implored Vice President Mike Pence to reject the
electoral votes certified by various states for Biden. Trump repeatedly insisted
that Pence was empowered to return certifications to states. 105 Like his factual
claims, Trump’s legal assertions were meritless. The Constitution does not
empower the President of the Senate or Congress to return the opened
certificates to the states for recertification. On the contrary, it states that once the
certifications the states sent are opened by the President of the Senate in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, “the votes shall then be
counted.” 106 The Constitution does not entitle the President of the Senate to
count electoral votes, and a range of textual, structural, and historical
considerations make it clear that he lacks such authority. The Constitution does
not even designate the President of the Senate as the presiding officer over the

matter how close the election may turn out to be, those who lose accept the verdict, and support
those who win.”).
100. Text of Gore’s Concession Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2000), https://www.nytimes
.com/2000/12/13/politics/text-of-goreacutes-concession-speech.html (calling, in part, for an end to
“partisan rancor” and asking God’s blessing on Bush’s presidency).
101. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
102. 147 CONG. REC. 101, 101–02, 104–06 (2001).
103. 163 CONG. REC. H185-90 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017).
104. Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral Count Act of
1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541, 556 (2004).
105. Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before U.S. Capitol Riot, ASSOC’D PRESS (Jan. 13,
2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-01-13/transcript-of-trumps-speech-at
-rally-before-us-capitol-riot (“All Vice President Pence has to do is send it back to the states to
recertify and we become president and you are the happiest people.”).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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proceedings, a role based on custom and statute. 107 Instead, it simply says that
they are the addressee of the lists of electoral votes from each state and “shall,
in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted[.]” 108 Significantly, the
Constitution directs the President of the Senate to “open” the certificates in this
specified, accountable venue but then shifts to passive voice regarding the
counting, leaving the counter unidentified. If the Constitution intended the
President of the Senate to count the votes, one would expect it to provide that
they count the votes as well as receive and “open the certificates,” but it does
not do so. 109 Longstanding practice confirms that the Senate president does not
count the votes and has largely a ceremonial role. 110 By 1793, Congress had
already designated tellers to count the votes once the Senate President opened
the certificates, 111 and that practice has been followed ever since. 112
And structural considerations confirm the propriety of entrusting the
counting to others. It would hardly be consistent with democratic practice to
allow one person to determine the outcome of a presidential election by his or
her count of the electoral votes, especially when that person is a co-partisan of
some candidates. The insult to democratic principles becomes even greater
when, as is often the case, the President of the Senate is a candidate for president
or for re-election as vice president. Just as no person should judge his or her own
case, no national candidate should count the votes to determine the outcome of
a presidential election. Accordingly, the Twelfth Amendment gives the
President of the Senate a very narrow assignment—receiving and opening the
certificates—and requires that he or she act in public before the assembled
members of Congress. 113 Indeed, the Twentieth Amendment rested on the
principle that any decisions Congress must make in determining the outcome of
a presidential election should not be made by those with an expiring mandate. 114
Remarkably, Trump refused to accept Pence’s determination regarding his
lack of discretion under the Constitution and laws. 115 Trump berated Pence
107. Joel K. Goldstein, A Mail Addressee and an Opener: The President of the Senate and
Counting Electoral Votes, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 203, 203, 204 (2020).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
109. See generally Goldstein, supra note 107, at 203–04.
110. Id.
111. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 645 (1793) (stating that once Vice President Adams opened, read and
delivered the certificates to “the tellers appointed for the purpose” the tellers “examined and
ascertained the votes” and prepared a list which they gave the vice president); 6 ANNALS OF CONG.
2096–98 (1797) (stating that Adams, upon opening the envelopes and reading the certificates, asked
the Senate Clerk to read the report which were then handed to the tellers who noted the contents).
112. Goldstein, supra note 107, at 204.
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
114. Goldstein, supra note 107, at 206.
115. Michael Pence, Dear Colleague Letter, CNN (Jan. 6, 2021, 1:25 PM), https://www.cnn
.com/2021/01/06/politics/pence-trump-electoral-college-letter/index.html.
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during remarks at a rally, and following his statements and those of others, the
mob of Trump supporters descended on the Capitol, assaulted law enforcement
officials, and presented a threat to the lives and safety of government officials
and others lawfully at the Capitol. Trump was aware of the attack on the Capitol
from telephone conversations and television coverage, yet failed to act
immediately to protect Pence and the other assembled officials as well as the
constitutional process, praised the motivation behind the disruption, and did
little and only belatedly and weakly to quiet the situation. 116
f.

Insurrection Clause

Consistent with its impact on constitutional jurisprudence, 117 the Fourteenth
Amendment is central to basic Constitutional Law courses. But those courses
typically focus on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in Section 1
and give some coverage to the adjacent Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities
Clauses and to Section 5’s grant of legislative enforcement authority to
Congress. By contrast, the Insurrection Clause, 118 the heart of Section 3, is part
of the Amendment’s flyover text where law professors and their students never
stop. 119
It’s easy to understand why. The Insurrection Clause was included to
preclude from holding national or state office those who, having previously
taken an oath to support the United States Constitution, had engaged “in
insurrection or rebellion” against the Constitution by siding with the

116. A Timeline of How the Jan. 6 Attack Unfolded — Including Who Said What and When,
NPR (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-timeline-of-how-the-jan-6attack-unfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when; Shelly Tan et al., How One of America’s
Ugliest Days Unraveled Inside and Outside the Capitol, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2021/capitol-insurrection-visual-timeline/.
117. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL
POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–2 (2015) (stating that “it is nearly
impossible to exaggerate the importance of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Joel K. Goldstein,
Teaching the Transformative Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 581, 582 (2018).
118. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 3 (“No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress,
or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.”).
119. See, e.g., Graber, supra note 4 (referring in 2018 to Section 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as part of the “forgotten Fourteenth Amendment”); Gerard Magliocca, Enforcing the
14th Amendment’s Bar on Insurrectionists Officers and Candidates, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Feb. 15,
2021), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/enforcing-the-14th-amendments-bar-on-insurrection
ist-officers-and-candidates/ (calling Section 3 “perhaps” the Constitution’s “most obscure part”
before Jan. 6, 2021).
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Confederacy during the Civil War. 120 Section 3, of course, speaks more broadly
and its text is not confined to the Civil War, 121 a limit that would have been easy
to state if intended. Even so, Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment never
becomes relevant because in America, officers who have sworn to support the
Constitution, do not routinely, in modern times, engage “in insurrection or
rebellion”—at least not until January 6, 2021.
The actions that day of Trump and some of his co-partisans to disrupt the
lawfully-prescribed electoral vote counting through extra-legal methods were
labelled as “insurrection” 122 and “terrorism” 123 even by some leading
Republicans. Professor Mark A. Graber and other leading scholars on the
Fourteenth Amendment 124 directed American Constitutional Law professors to
Section 3 to address the actions of Trump and some of his supporters. It does not
explicitly state who must make a finding that a covered official “engaged in
insurrection or rebellion” or gave “aid or comfort” to enemies of the American
Constitution or the applicable standard for that determination. 125 Section 5 does,
however, empower Congress “to enforce” legislatively the Amendment. 126
Graber pointed out that Section 3 uses mandatory language (“shall”) in
disqualifying from office-holding one who, having taken an oath to support the
Constitution “engaged in insurrection or rebellion” against the Constitution. 127
120. Mark A. Graber, Their Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3, and Ours, JUST SEC. (Feb. 16,
2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/74739/their-fourteenth-amendment-section-3-and-ours/.
121. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §3 (stating that “No person” shall hold federal or state office
who “having previously taken an oath” as a federal or state official “to support the Constitution of
the United States shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same . . .”); Graber,
supra note 120 (stating that although Section 3 was designed to disqualify from future officeholding those who violated oaths by supporting confederacy, “Section 3 would, of course, apply to
any future insurrection.”); see also Gerard Magliocca, The 14th Amendment’s Disqualification
Provision and the Events of Jan. 6, LAWFARE (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/14thamendments-disqualification-provision-and-events-jan-6 (discussing limited authority regarding
what constitutes an “insurrection”).
122. See, e.g., Statement by President George W. Bush on Insurrection at the Capitol, supra
note 2.
123. See 167 CONG. REC. S735 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2021) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell)
(stating that mob on January 6, 2021, used “terrorism” because President Trump fed them “wild
falsehoods”).
124. Bruce Ackerman & Gerard Magliocca, Impeachment Won’t Keep Trump From Running
Again. Here’s a Better Way, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2021/01/11/impeachment-wont-keep-trump-running-again-heres-better-way/.
125. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 3; see Magliocca, supra note 121 (discussing roles of
Congress, courts, and state officials in various scenarios and whether presidential pardons are
relevant).
126. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5; see Magliocca, supra note 119 (pointing out advantages
of Congressional action under Section 5); Magliocca, supra note 121 (discussing whether Section
3 is self-executing).
127. Mark A. Graber, Section Three to the Rescue, CONSTITUTIONALIST (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://theconstitutionalist.org/2021/01/11/section-three-to-the-rescue-by-mark-graber/.
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The provision would seem to apply to a president, 128 and it would allow
Congress to determine that Trump and others who engaged in the insurrection
after taking oaths to support the Constitution are precluded from future officeholding. 129 Graber argued that a subsequent finding by Congress signed by
President Biden that Trump participated in an “insurrection” on January 6, 2021,
would nullify his actions as president from that date on. 130 Graber pointed out
that those who supported Section 3 denied that it was a Bill of Attainder since it
merely set qualifications of office-holding rather than imposed a punishment; in
any event, as a constitutional text, it would supersede inconsistent prior
provisions. 131 Some scholars identified political hazards in using Section 3
regarding Trump. 132
g.

Conclusion

Trump’s presidency accordingly should cause Constitutional Law teachers
to consider including discussion of some traditionally ignored constitutional
provisions which Trump’s behavior introduced into contemporary discussion.
There are advantages to giving some class attention to subjects of recent public
discourse, and they raise interesting questions about constitutional
interpretation: What does it tell us that these long-dormant clauses emerged
during the Trump presidency? Are there other such provisions? To what extent
should clauses, like Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, be bound by
their original purpose to address instances of physical, mental, or logistical
inability and to what extent are they capable of broader application? How are
textual silences, in, say, the Pardon Power, interpreted? What problems arise
when a clause is subject to initial application or when issues of first impression

128. Id.; Daniel J. Hemel, Disqualifying Insurrectionists and Rebels: A How-To Guide,
LAWFARE (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/disqualifying-insurrectionists-and-rebels
-how-guide.
129. Graber, supra note 127.
130. Id.
131. Mark A. Graber, Section 3 and (Not) Bills of Attainder, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2021/01/section-three-and-not-bills-of-attainder.html; Magliocca,
supra note 121 (discussing Bill of Attainder argument).
132. See Andrew Coan, Section Three and Politics by Other Means, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 12,
2021), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2021/01/section-three-and-politics-by-other.html. A number of
legal actions have been filed to block some members of Congress and others from seeking office
for allegedly violating Section 3. See Jonathan Weisman, Legal Effort Expands to Disqualify
Republicans as ‘Insurrectionsists,’ N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 7, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04
/07/us/politics/insurrectionists-congress.html. See also Camila Pedrosa, Appeal Planned After
Dismissal of Suit Seeking to Keep 3 GOP Candidates Off Arizona Ballot, KTAR NEWS (Apr. 26,
2022), https://ktar.com/story/5027438/appeal-planned-after-dismissal-of-suit-seeking-to-keep-3gop-candidates-off-arizona-ballot/ (reporting appeal planned of dismissal of three Jan. 6, 2021
lawsuits for lack of standing).
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arise in politically polarized circumstances? Many require non-jurists to
construe the Constitution, a common experience in American government and
one which some students may experience in their careers but one which
introduces some novel features. How should partisans go about deciding such
constitutional questions?
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSAULT
The simplest pedagogical response to Trump’s presidency is just to tweak
the syllabus to include a few cases and arcane clauses which Trump’s presidency
spotlighted and otherwise proceed as we did before. That would be a mistake. It
would badly underestimate the impact of Trump’s presidency on the
Constitution by focusing on discrete constitutional provisions at the risk of
obscuring the more fundamental challenge it presented to foundational
constitutional ideals. That assault occurred not only in the behavior considered
by the previously addressed cases and clauses, but by Trump’s pervasive
disparagement of norms and conventions which had been established to
vindicate constitutional ideals. Focusing only on cases and clauses would miss
an important opportunity to make Constitutional Law courses richer by giving
greater consideration to three inter-related areas that now deserve more
attention: (1) the role of constitutional norms and conventions in implementing
the Constitution and its ideals; (2) the foundational ideals behind the
Constitution; and (3) the dependence of our constitutional system on officials
and citizens giving priority to constitutional ideals in public behavior even when
so doing does not serve their immediate partisan advantage. This section
considers them in turn.
A.

Trump’s Disparagement of Constitutional Norms & Conventions

Trump was distinctive in his disregard for long-standing constitutional
norms and conventions. 133 A full listing here is neither possible nor necessary to
suggest the extent to which Trump violated and defied long-standing norms
developed to vindicate constitutional values. 134
Trump’s anti-Muslim messages described in the discussion of Trump v.
Hawaii was part of a corpus of rhetoric attacking racial and other disadvantaged
minority groups in violation of a norm of respect for human dignity which has

133. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President
Donald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177, 190 (2018) (stating that Trump stands alone in his disregard of
political norms and constitutional conventions); James P. Pfiffner, Donald Trump and the Norms
of the Presidency, 51 PRS. STD. Q. 96 (2021) (describing Trump’s defiance of presidential norms
critical to American democracy).
134. On the difference between norms and conventions, see Siegel, supra note 133, at 179–90;
Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1430,
1433–34 (2018). Hereafter, I often use “norm” to refer to both concepts.
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constitutional underpinnings. 135 Trump is not the first president to clash with the
press, but his “rhetoric and the centrality of press animus to his political
program” were distinctive. 136 A range of measures sought to limit media access
to government officials, especially of those journalists Trump deemed
unfriendly, 137 and Trump’s attacks sought to delegitimize the press by attacking
it as the purveyor of “fake news” and as the “enemy of the . . . people,” a term
Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin used. 138
Trump acted to politicize criminal law contrary to the post-Nixon norm that
partisan considerations should not animate criminal investigations and
prosecution decisions. 139 From his “Lock her up!” campaign rhetoric directed at
his opponent, former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, 140 to his insistence on
“loyalty” from the intended-independent FBI director James Comey and
ultimate dismissal of him in response to an FBI investigation of links between
Russia and Trump’s campaign, to his attempts to shut down the investigation of
Special Counsel Robert Mueller, to his calls for his predecessor and successor
to be indicted 141 and beyond, Trump treated the Department of Justice as an
instrument to reward friends and settle scores against enemies in blatant defiance
of the norms implicit in his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.” 142
Although there has been a long-standing norm of executive branch officials
treating the federal judiciary and federal judges with respect, even when
disagreeing with their decisions, Trump repeatedly disparaged federal judges
and courts. 143 In defiance of a bipartisan norm extending more than forty years
and eight presidencies, Trump refused to release his tax returns as a presidential
candidate in 2016 and 2020, and throughout his presidency. 144 His excuse, that
135. See Siegel, supra note 133, at 191–92; Pfiffner, supra note 133, at 98–99; Chafetz &
Pozen, supra note 134, at 1451.
136. BAUER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 88.
137. Id. at 97–101.
138. Siegel, supra note 133, at 192–93.
139. BAUER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 137, 142; Pfiffner, supra note 133, at 108; Chafetz
& Pozen, supra note 134, at 1451.
140. Siegel, supra note 133, at 200–01.
141. BAUER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 147–53; Pfiffner, supra note 133, at 108–09;
Siegel, supra note 133, at 199, 200–01.
142. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
143. Siegel, supra note 133, at 193–95. See also BOSTON BAR ASS’N, JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: PROMOTING JUSTICE AND MAINTAINING DEMOCRACY 4 (August 2019)
(discussing rhetoric and actions which threaten judicial independence); id. at 9–12 (discussing
improper attacks by Trump and others on judges and their consequences).
144. BAUER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 73–78 (reporting that other than Trump, presidents
beginning with Jimmy Carter in 1977 had released tax returns as did presidential candidates from
1976 on other than Gerald R. Ford who in 1976 released summaries of nine years of returns); see
also FEERICK, supra note 77, at 142 (stating that Ford’s tax returns for seven years were examined
by Congressional committees and that the Internal Revenue Service audited five years of returns
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he was under audit, was problematic. The federal returns of the president and
vice president have been subject to automatic audit since 1977, and the practice
of presidents over four decades established a disclosure norm to promote
transparency, accountability, and faith in the governmental process. 145 While a
private citizen might be reluctant to subject themselves to the intrusions or added
scrutiny of public disclosure, a president or presidential candidate assumes a
public role with different expectations, including those of the disclosure norm. 146
The recitation of these few examples omits many others but should suffice
to suggest the aberrational nature of Trump’s presidency. The norms and
conventions outlined here all trace to, and implemented, constitutional clauses
and values. Accordingly, Trump’s behavior resisted constitutional practices that
his predecessors, and successor, have followed on a bipartisan basis. The
following subsection will say more about the significance of this conduct for the
Constitution. Yet the topic also presents possibilities to expand the discussion in
basic Constitutional Law courses in ways that will enrich students’
understanding of the subject: What is the role of constitutional norms and
conventions? How do we determine that a norm exists? 147 Why do they exist?
Are they enforceable and, if so, by whom? 148 How do norms change? 149 Is it
desirable that norms be stable as opposed to dynamic? 150 Is it more troubling
that Trump violated substantively appealing norms than simply that he flouted
norms? 151
B.

Trump’s Assault on Constitutional Values

The obscure constitutional backstops Trump’s behavior put into play, and
the norms and conventions he violated, suggest a more basic point: Trump’s
behavior was inconsistent with and attacked certain fundamental principles
which animate the Constitution. Jurists and other people can and do have good
faith differences regarding constitutional meaning on any number of
controversial topics, many of which have traditionally formed the heart of
Constitutional Law courses. That’s not what is distinctive about Trump’s

incident to his nomination to be vice president under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in
1973); id. at 175, 178 (discussing consideration of Nelson R. Rockefeller’s tax returns incident to
his nomination to be vice president under Section 2 in 1974).
145. BAUER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 74–75.
146. Id. at 77–78.
147. See Whittington, supra note 82, at 21.
148. See id. at 24–26.
149. See id. at 20 (discussing whether accumulation of norm violations changes norm); Chafetz
& Pozen, supra note 134, at 1435–38 (discussing norm destruction, decomposition, and
displacement by law as separate phenomena).
150. See, e.g., Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 134, at 1445–47.
151. See id. at 1450–52 (arguing that substantive appeal of norms Trump violated is more
important than fact of violating norms).
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presidency. Rather, Trump’s presidency was a deliberate, sustained, and
undeniable assault on bedrock constitutional values which have traditionally
united most Americans even as they disagreed on discrete constitutional
questions. And the support given to Trump by office-holders and citizens
notwithstanding his Constitution-defying behavior, even after he resorted to
improper means or incited insurrection, suggests that many Americans do not
understand or accept fundamental ideals behind our Constitution or are willing
to sacrifice them to advance their partisan interests.
These propositions have consequence for basic Constitutional Law courses.
The Constitution is not simply a collection of discrete phrases creating national
government, allocating and limiting governmental powers and duties, and
conferring rights. It articulates and rests on certain fundamental principles and
purposes which direct our national aspirations. As Richard H. Fallon, Jr. wrote,
although Americans “are a dramatically diverse people in many ways,”
generally “we are joined by our allegiance to the Constitution and our shared
acceptance of the governmental structure that the Constitution creates,” 152 even
if we find some procedures deficient. 153 It’s worth taking note and acting when
presented with unmistakable evidence that many do not understand or subscribe
to foundational principles of the Constitution. Perhaps basic courses should
place greater focus on those principles as a start.
The Constitution’s Preamble makes some principles and purposes explicit—
forming “a more perfect Union,” establishing “Justice,” insuring “domestic
Tranquility,” providing “for the common defense,” promoting “the general
welfare,” and securing the “Blessing of Liberty” for “the People of the United
States” and their “Posterity.” 154 The Preamble also signals a relationship
between persons who are part of “We, the People” and a belief that government
can and should achieve common goods in a just way respectful of individual
freedom. The Constitution, as amended and interpreted, makes other basic
precepts implicit since they animate its clauses and cases. One such principle is
a commitment to pluralism, inclusivity, and equal citizenship among persons of
different races, religions, genders, national origins, and other demographic
features. 155 Another bedrock premise is a conviction that public decisionmaking should be based on civil discourse, rational consideration of facts and
152. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xviii (2004).
153. Id. at xix.
154. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
155. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 1, cl. 3 (Prohibition of “religious Test” as qualification
for office implicitly signaling the members of minority religions are not excluded from officeholding); amend. I (prohibition against establishment of religion, free exercise clause, free speech
and free press clauses protecting minorities and dissidents); amend. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIII,
XXIV, XXVI; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954) (prohibiting government
conduct that sends message to minority group members that they are outsiders).
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arguments, and consensus. 156 Democracy 157 and commitment to the rule of
law 158 count as other basic principles. If I were now teaching a basic
Constitutional Law course, I would do more to expose these features of the
Constitution as it has developed in addition to the more conventional tendency
to emphasize historical development of doctrine and the use of constitutional
arguments. Yes, they are structural ideas, but that character gives them a status
that commands attachment.
There is not space here to demonstrate in detail the constitutional roots of
each ideal or how Trump’s presidency assaulted each although the cases can be
made. 159 For present purposes, however, it is worth focusing on two of the
bedrock constitutional principles the Trump presidency assaulted and how basic
Constitutional Law courses might respond. The ideals of democratic decisionmaking and the rule of law clearly rank among the basic principles of the
Constitution. In part, they commit America to choosing governors through free
and fair elections with widespread participation, so decision-makers reflect and
respond to public sentiment and to deciding elections in favor of candidates who
are elected based on pre-existing rules as determined by impartial counters. The
rule of law is a complicated and contestable concept, 160 but at a minimum in this
context, it requires that elections are conducted in accordance with law, with
disputes determined by impartial decision-makers in accordance with law, and
with final decisions made pursuant to the system followed even by those who
preferred a different outcome.
Trump challenged basic tenets of constitutional democracy in
unprecedented ways. Even before his term began, unmistakable signs warned
that he threatened American constitutionalism. In an influential work, political
scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt suggested a four-part test to
anticipate prospective autocrats: a weak commitment to democratic rules, denial
of the legitimacy of opponents, toleration or encouragement of partisan violence,

156. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2 & 3 (setting forth bicameralism and presentment
pre-requisites to law-making as encouraging deliberation); art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (Opinion Clause
authorizing president to require written opinion from principal officer of executive departments
with matters relating to their duties); cl. 2 (advise and consent requirements for treaty-making and
confirmation of officers); § 3 (requirement that president provide Congress with information
regarding State of the Union and “recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he [she]
shall judge necessary and expedient”); art. III, § 1 (vesting the judicial power).
157. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., pmbl. (identifying “We the People . . . ” as source of Constitution);
amend. I (guaranteeing free speech, free press, right of assembly and petitioning government);
amend. XIV, XV, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI (expanding franchise).
158. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997).
159. I hope to do so in a future work expanding on some of the ideas set forth in my October
2019 Donald J. Sutherland Lecture at Hofstra University.
160. See Fallon, supra note 158.
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and willingness to curtail civil liberties of non-supporters. 161 They found that
Trump tested positive on all four counts based on his pre-2016 election attacks
on the legitimacy of the electoral process,162 his fabricated birtherism assault on
the legitimacy of the presidency of Barack Obama, his penchant for labeling
Secretary of State Clinton a “criminal” (“Lock her up!”), 163 his encouragement
of violence, sometimes explicit, sometimes veiled but unmistakable, against his
critics and opponents, 164 and his demonization of Clinton and his media
critics. 165
Trump took his assault on democracy and rule of law to new levels in 2020–
21. New information is ever-emerging, but reports to date portray an
unprecedented assault on democracy and the rule of law by Trump and allies.
Prior to the election, Trump and close associates plotted to withhold support for
Ukraine in order to encourage an investigation into Biden and his son. During
the 2020 campaign and following the election, Trump suggested without any
basis that the election involved massive fraud and had been stolen from him. He
and his supporters litigated the outcome to an unprecedented extent. Although
judges (including conservative jurists appointed by Trump or other Republican
presidents) ruled against Trump and his supporters in more than sixty cases (and
for Trump’s position only once), 166 Trump refused to accept adverse results. In
some cases, the nature of the litigation resulted in judicially-imposed sanctions
being ordered against some attorneys acting for Trump’s side. 167

161. STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 61–67 (2018).
162. Id. at 61.
163. Id. at 62.
164. Id. at 62–64.
165. Id. at 64–65.
166. Russell Wheeler, Trump’s Judicial Campaign to Upend the 2020 Election: A Failure, But
Not a Wipeout, BROOKINGS (Nov. 30, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/11/30/
trumps-judicial-campaign-to-upend-the-2020-election-a-failure-but-not-a-wipe-out/ (finding that
only twenty-eight of 194 federal or state judges or fourteen percent decided in favor of Trump’s
position);William Cummings et al., By the Numbers: President Donald Trump’s Failed Efforts to
Overturn the Election, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/
politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumps-failed-efforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001/
(reporting that Trump’s position failed in sixty-one of sixty-two cases challenging election).
167. See, e.g., Nicole Hong et al., Court Suspends Giuliani’s Law License, Citing Trump
Election Lies, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/nyregion/
giuliani-law-license-suspended-trump.html (reporting on decision of highest court of New York
temporarily suspending Trump attorney Rudy Giuliani’s law license for improper behavior while
representing Trump in election disputes pending further proceedings); Alan Feuer, Judge Orders
Sanctions Against Pro-Trump Lawyers Over Election Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/25/us/politics/sidney-powell-election-sanctions.html
(reporting on decision of Michigan federal judge sanctioning nine Trump lawyers). Some aspects
of the Michigan decision were appealed. See Clara Hendrickson, Kraken Lawyers Appear to
Comply with Sanctions Order for Conspiracy-Laden Election Lawsuit, DET. FREE PRESS (Feb. 25,
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Not only did Trump not accept final judicial decisions and the judgments of
government officials whom he had appointed, 168 he instead pursued
extraordinary action. After Chris Krebs, the Trump appointee who oversaw the
Department of Homeland Security’s effort to protect the election from foreign
interference, rebutted the unsupported claims of fraud of Trump and his
attorneys, Trump fired him. 169 Trump reportedly badgered Department of
Justice officials to declare the election corrupt and refused to listen when leaders
he appointed advised that his information was wrong and no evidence suggested
a basis to challenge the outcome. After authorizing the Department of Justice to
investigate allegations of vote fraud, Attorney General William Barr, a Trump
loyalist, announced there was no widespread vote fraud that would change the
election’s outcome. 170 Barr reportedly told an outraged Trump that his effort to
show fraud was a “clown show.” 171 After Barr resigned, Trump subjected his
replacement as acting attorney general and his deputy to frequent phone calls
pressuring them to declare the election corrupt, notwithstanding their conclusion
that Trump’s claims lacked any basis. 172 They, too, refused to assert that the
election was stolen from Trump. In a rambling call, Trump told the Republican
Secretary of State of Georgia, Brad Raffensperger, and other election officials
2022), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2022/02/25/pro-trump-lawyersappear-comply-sanctions-order/6937886001/.
168. See, e.g., 167 CONG. REC. S14 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Sen. Mitch
McConnell) (noting that “[d]ozens of lawsuits” considered Trump’s claims but “over and over”
courts rejected Trump’s claims, “including all-star judges” Trump had nominated); id. at S26 (daily
ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Sen. Mitt Romney) (stating that “scores of courts,” Trump’s “own
Attorney General” and state election officials had “reached that unequivocal decision” that Biden
had won and Trump lost); id. at S27 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Sen. Rob Portman)
(noting that “after two months of recounts and legal challenges, not a single State recount changed
the result. And of the dozens of lawsuits files, not one found evidence of fraud or irregularities
widespread enough to change the result of the election.”); id. at S31 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021)
(statement of Sen. Lindsay Graham, R. S.C.) (stating that Trump had failed in challenges to various
state elections and “enough is enough”); id. at S34 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Sen. Susan
Collins) (stating that Trump had had opportunity over two months to challenge returns but his
challenges had been rejected in nearly sixty cases).
169. Alana Wise, Trump Fires Election Security Director Who Corrected Voter Fraud
Disinformation, NPR (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/17/936003057/cisa-directorchris-krebs-fired-after-trying-to-correct-voter-fraud-disinformati’.
170. Michael Balsamo, Disputing Trump, Barr Says No Widespread Election Fraud, ASSOC’D
PRESS (Dec. 1, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/barr-no-widespread-election-fraud-b1f1488796c
9a98c4b1a9061a6c7f49d.
171. Matthew Brown, ‘It’s Just a Joke’: Former AG William Barr Derided Trump’s False
Election Claims, USA TODAY (June 27, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics
/2021/06/27/barr-describes-rift-trump-rift-over-election-fraud-claim-interviews/5365066001/.
172. Devlin Barrett & Josh Dawsey, Trump to Acting AG, According to Aide’s Notes: ‘Just say
the Election was Corrupt + Leave the Rest to me,’ WASH. POST (July 31, 2021), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-rosen-phone-call-notes/2021/07/30/2e9430d6-f14d-11eb81d2-ffae0f931b8f_story.html.
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that he needed 11,780 votes to switch and suggested that they would be
committing a crime if they failed to respond favorably to his election
complaints. 173
Trump’s behavior sent ominous signs. In a remarkable bipartisan action, all
ten living former Secretaries of Defense joined in an Op-Ed on January 3, 2021,
stating that the election was over and that it confirmed Biden’s victory and
Trump’s defeat. The Op-Ed further asserted that the military has no role in
determining election outcomes. 174 The ten signatories included Trump’s two
Secretaries of Defense as well as the living occupants of that position under
Republican Presidents Gerald R. Ford, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush
(Ronald Reagan’s Pentagon chiefs having been deceased) and included four
individuals (Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney, William Cohen, and Chuck
Hagel) who had been elected Republican members of Congress and, in Cheney’s
case, vice president.
Wow! Think about that! That this seasoned collection of national security
officials, who had served presidents of both parties, including Trump, felt
compelled to issue such an unprecedented statement speaks volumes regarding
the threat they perceived that Trump would attempt extra-legal efforts to retain
power.
Trump’s efforts to direct the behavior of the Department of Justice and state
officials in improper ways was not the totality of his effort. He tried to persuade
Vice President Pence to abuse the narrow limits on his role as the presiding
officer of the electoral count to reject Biden electors in some states. When Pence
advised that he would not defy the legal restrictions on his role, Trump and close
associates spoke to a rally on January 6, 2021, in inflammatory ways. The mob
proceeded to the Capitol Building and Trump’s supporters violently
overwhelmed and injured law-enforcement officers and broke into the Capitol,
disrupted the constitutional proceedings, and presented a threat to the lives of
those present, including Pence and others in the line of presidential
succession. 175 Trump was aware of the situation, which was covered on media
173. Amy Gardner & Paula Firozi, Here’s the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between
Trump and Raffensperger, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d
82356_story.html; Michael D. Shear & Stephanie Saul, Trump, in Taped Call, Pressured Georgia
Official to ‘Find’ Votes to Overturn Election, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes
.com/2021/01/03/us/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-georgia.html.
174. Ashton Carter et al., Involving the Military in Election Disputes Would Cross into
Dangerous Territory, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/10former-defense-secretaries-military-peaceful-transfer-of-power/2021/01/03/2a23d52e-4c4d-11eba9f4-0e668b9772ba_story.html.
175. See, e.g., Trump v. Thompson, 20 F4th 10, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.
1350 (2022); Glenn Kessler, The Jan. 6 Attack on the Capitol: A Guide to What We Now Know,
WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/06/january-6attack-capitol-guide-what-we-now-know/; A Timeline of how the Jan. 6 Attack Unfolded —
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and from communications, yet for hours failed to act to enforce the law or protect
the constitutional proceedings and national officers, 176 in violation of his oath
and his duty to act to protect constitutional processes.
Trump’s conduct was, without question, far outside the boundaries of
acceptable American political conduct. He proceeded without evidence, even
when the leaders of the Department of Justice he had appointed advised his
claims lacked any basis and in the face of judicial defeats. His action led to
violence and disruption of the constitutional process of counting the electoral
votes. He did not act promptly to stop the assault on the constitutional process.
The Republican Senate leader, Mitch McConnell, referred to the January 6
assault on Congress as an “insurrection” 177 and later told the Senate that “the
mob was fed lies” and “provoked” by Trump “and other powerful people” to
prevent the “rule of law” and disrupt the certification of “the people’s choice”
of Biden as president. 178 Former President George W. Bush likened the protest
to conduct in a “banana republic” and was “appalled by the reckless behavior of
some political leaders since the election.” The disruption was due to people
“whose passions have been inflamed by falsehoods and false hopes.” 179
President Bush was clearly talking about Trump and some of his supporters. On
January 13, 2021, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy agreed that Trump
“bears responsibility for Wednesday’s attack on Congress by mob rioters” and
criticized Trump for not “immediately” denouncing “the mob when he saw what
was unfolding.” 180
Indeed, Republican Representative Jaime Herrera Beutler reported that
when McCarthy spoke to Trump on January 6, 2021, during the insurrection and
implored Trump to forcefully tell his supporters to desist in the riot, Trump first
claimed the mob was Antifa, and after McCarthy rebutted that and told him they
consisted of Trump supporters, Trump responded, “Well, Kevin, I guess these
people are more upset about the election than you are.” 181 Trump was impeached
for an unprecedented second time but escaped conviction because only fiftyIncluding who said what and when, NPR (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/106997
7469/a-timeline-of-how-the-jan-6-attack-unfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when; Tan et al.,
supra note 116.
176. Kessler, supra note 175.
177. 167 CONG. REC. S18 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021).
178. 167 CONG. REC. S49 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 2021).
179. Statement by President George W. Bush on Insurrection at the Capitol, supra note 2.
180. 167 CONG. REC. H172 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2021).
181. Press Release, Jaime Herrera Beutler, U.S. Congresswoman, Herrera Beutler Again
Confirms Conversation with McCarthy Regarding Jan. 6 U.S. Capitol Attack (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://jhb.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=402083; see also Press Release,
Jaime Herrera Beutler, U.S. Congresswoman, Herrera Beutler “Yes” on Impeachment (Jan. 12,
2021) (stating that McCarthy had described pleading with Trump to make a televised statement to
“end . . . the mayhem” but “to no avail”), https://jhb.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Docu
mentID=402082.
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seven (including seven Republican) senators voted to convict him, short of the
two-thirds majority. Many of the forty-three Republicans who opposed
convicting Trump argued that a former official could not be tried on
impeachment. 182 And following the impeachment vote, McConnell described
the acts of January 6, 2021, as “terrorism” which occurred because Trump had
“fed wild falsehoods” to the mob. Trump was “practically and morally
responsible for provoking the events” of January 6, 183 McConnell said.
C. Constitutional Morality
Of course, Trump was unsuccessful. Congress recognized that Biden was
lawfully elected, and he was installed as the new president, consistent with his
306-vote electoral majority which provided a comfortable cushion over the 270
necessary to elect. A possible verdict on the 2020 election is that the system
worked, the democratic verdict was honored consistent with prevailing rules and
authoritative decisions.
Yet the system only worked because some Republican (as well as
Democratic) officials did not follow the lead of Trump and some of his
associates in acting in defiance of the Constitution and law. Georgia’s Secretary
of State Raffensperger refused to succumb to Trump’s entreaties to flip Georgia
to him. Republican governors in Georgia and Arizona certified the Democratic
electors in accordance with law. Most Republican senators agreed when
McConnell implored them not to engage in a baseless challenge to Biden’s
election, but a few, led by Senators Josh Hawley of Missouri and Senator Ted
Cruz of Texas, did not abide by his call even after witnessing the insurrection. 184
Vice President Pence resisted Trump’s entreaties to abuse the limited powers of
his position in presiding over the electoral count, perhaps influenced by the
sentiment of majorities in both houses that included sizeable numbers of
Republican senators and representatives. Conservative Representative Liz
Cheney, who as House Republican Conference chair, had supported most of

182. See, e.g., 167 CONG. REC. S736 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2021) (statement of Sen. McConnell)
(claiming that the Senate had no power to convict and disqualify a former officer).
183. 167 CONG. REC. S735 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2021). See also id. at H138 (daily ed. Feb. 13,
2021) (statement of Rep. John Katko) (“The President’s role in the insurrection is undeniable.”);
id. at S27 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Sen. Rob Portman) (stating that mob thought the
election was stolen because Trump had been so stating for two months); id. at S32 (daily ed. Jan.
6, 2021) (statement of Sen. Pat Toomey) (“We saw bloodshed because the demagogue chose to
spread falsehoods and sow distrust of his fellow Americans.”).
184. See, e.g., 167 CONG. REC. S20 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Sen. Mike Lee)
(arguing that Congress could simply open and count the votes not engage in review of the sort
objectors sought); id. at S26 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Sen. Rob Portman) (stating that
he stood with the Constitution which did not empower Congress to act as objectors sought); id. at
S32 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (remarks of Sen. Pat Toomey) (stating that Sen. Hawley’s challenges
to Pennsylvania vote would deny Pennsylvania’s voters the opportunity to choose their electors).
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Trump’s policy initiatives, was among the Republicans who voted to impeach.
She announced before the vote:
The President of the United States summoned this mob, assembled the
mob, and lit the flame of this attack. Everything that followed was his
doing. None of this would have happened without the President. The
President could have immediately and forcefully intervened to stop the
violence. He did not. There has never been a greater betrayal by a
President of the United States of his office and his oath to the
Constitution. 185
That the 2020 election produced the lawful result should not encourage
complacency regarding the efficacy of America’s constitutional system. The
2020 election reminds us that constitutional provisions are not self-executing. 186
They must be interpreted and applied by human beings. 187 Trump’s effort to
prevent Biden’s clear and lawful election failed because ultimately enough
Republican office-holders, in Trump’s administration, in Congress, and in states,
and judges appointed by Republican presidents and governors joined with
Democrats in giving priority to their legal duty over their partisan preferences.
Such behavior is routine in most elections. Still Trump’s abuse of the system
and the subsequent effort to ostracize Republicans who place constitutional duty
over partisan demands threaten to make the ordinary behavior that allows
constitutional democracy to function exceptional, thereby subverting democracy
and the rule of law.
The framers, of course, worried that selfish motives might interfere with the
government’s purpose to achieve public good. They appreciated human reason
as an asset to be deployed but did not idealize human nature. “If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary,” James
Madison wrote in Federalist 51. 188 Since neither condition would exist, the
Constitution’s text and structure represented an effort to encourage virtuous
behavior. They thought that a republic would provide decision-makers more
likely to bring the wisdom to discern the public interest and the patriotism and
commitment to justice which would override “temporary or partial

185. Press Release, Liz Cheney, Wyoming Congresswoman, Cheney: I Will Vote to Impeach
the President (Jan. 12, 2021), https://cheney.house.gov/2021/01/12/cheney-i-will-vote-to-impeachthe-president/.
186. See, e.g., LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 161, at 99 (explaining that constitutional
guardrails are insufficient to prevent authoritarian behavior due to the failure of constitutional text
to speak to all issues and to speak unambiguously and the tendency of officials to act to undermine
constitutional spirit).
187. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 76, at 482–85 (discussing the need for officials to act with
constitutional morality in impeachment proceedings).
188. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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considerations,” 189 that dividing governmental power would give those in
different institutions incentive to check abuses, and that dependence on the
people would help control government. 190
Those sworn to uphold the Constitution are obliged to give constitutional
considerations higher weight than partisan preferences. That obligation is
implicit in the Supremacy Clause as interpreted in Marbury v. Madison 191 and
consistent with numerous decisions confirming that the Constitution supersedes
other forms of law. The Oath Clause compelling federal and state officials in the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches to take an oath to support the
Constitution provides further indication of its centrality to civic behavior. 192
Moreover, our constitutional system depends on the commitment of officials and
citizens to act with what Herbert Brownell, a long-time Republican leader and
Attorney General under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, called “constitutional
morality” or “constitutional propriety.” Brownell expressed this point in 1957
when he told a Congressional committee:
More important than any of the written safeguards are those provided by our
political processes, for ultimately the operation of any constitutional
arrangement, depends on public opinion, and upon the public’s processing a
certain sense of constitutional morality. In the absence of this sense of
constitutional morality on the part of the citizenry, there can be, of course, no
guaranty against the usurpation of power or any coup d’etat. In other words, no
mechanical or procedural solution will provide a complete answer, if one
assumes hypothetical cases in which most of the parties are rogues and in which
no sense of constitutional propriety exists. 193

Brownell echoed that insight in writings 194 and other testimony, 195 and it was
included in congressional reports that provide part of the legislative history of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 196 Experience teaches that
authoritarian regimes generally emerge when political elites fail to act to isolate
189. Id. No. 10, at 82 (James Madison).
190. Id. No. 51, at 322.
191. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 3; see also id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (prescribing presidential oath to
“preserve, protect and defend” the Constitution).
193. Presidential Inability: Hearings before the Special Subcomm. On Study of Presidential
Inability of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 31 (1957) (statement of Herbert Brownell,
Jr.).
194. Herbert Brownell Jr., Presidential Disability: The Need for a Constitutional Amendment,
68 YALE L.J. 189, 200 (1958).
195. Presidential Inability: Hearings before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 242
(1965) (statement of Herbert Brownell, Jr.); Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of
the Vice President: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 136 (1964) (statement of Herbert Brownell, Jr.).
196. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-1382,
at 11 (1964).
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demagogues and when citizens elevate partisan preferences over constitutional
principle. 197
Some gave voice to a similar ideal to implore colleagues to recognize
constitutional duty as a higher calling than partisan preference or personal
ambition. Senator Mitt Romney, the last Republican presidential nominee before
Trump, said on January 6, 2021: 198
In light of today’s sad circumstances, I ask my colleague: Do we weigh our own
political fortunes more heavily than we weigh the strength of our Republic, the
strength of our democracy, and the cause of freedom? What is the weight of
personal acclaim compared to the weight of conscience?

The Trump presidency, accordingly, suggests that Constitutional Law
courses should give greater attention to the basic ideals that animate the
Constitution and the extent to which the survival of constitutional government
depends on office-holders and citizens acting in a principled way even when so
doing is inconsistent with their partisan preferences. That reality is reflected in
the norms and conventions officials follow to implement the Constitution. The
Constitution depends on governmental officials giving priority to constitutional
provisions and principles. They are more likely to do so if the public values
constitutional ideals and holds their leaders accountable when they deviate from
them, and the public is more likely to do so if leaders treat constitutional
principles seriously rather than as dispensable when inconvenient.
D. A Pedagogical Note
Some pedagogical considerations and challenges emerge from the
circumstance that Constitutional Law courses include students from across the
political spectrum. A Constitution, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
reminded, “is made for people of fundamentally differing views,” 199 and
Constitutional Law courses include students with different political and
ideological inclinations. To some extent, this circumstance is a variation of a
more common challenge of teaching Constitutional Law courses since the
controversial nature of some topics and the way they may impact some members
of the class personally calls for special sensitivity in classroom discussion. To
make class welcoming to all and to encourage students to develop and express
their own views, when I taught, I generally discussed strengths and weaknesses
of opinions, approaches to constitutional argument, and justices without
generally expressing my conclusions or preferences, although students could
discover some of them in my scholarship if they were moved to find and read it.

197. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 161, at 19–20, 69–71. See also TIMOTHY SNYDER, ON
TYRANNY: TWENTY LESSONS FROM THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2017).
198. 167 CONG. REC. S26 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021).
199. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Generally, issues Trump’s presidency raised can be similarly handled. So,
for instance, impeachment, presidential inability, and even January 6 can be
discussed without the professor taking a position on the ultimate questions.
Constitutional norms and practices can be stated, their constitutional
underpinnings explored through questions (Why has there been a norm of tax
return disclosure? Why has there been a norm not to disparage judges or the
press?). Similarly, foundational constitutional concepts like the rule of law,
democracy, pluralism, and rational decision-making can be presented as
constitutional values and their importance, roots, and implications discussed
without highlighting January 6, Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and his
suggestion that people chug bleach to combat Covid-19.
Yet teaching doesn’t always mandate apparent neutrality. The Constitution
may be for people with different views, but it rejects racism and other
exclusionary views, and rests on commitments to the rule of law, democracy,
and civil exchange based on reasoned consideration of information, and rejects
authoritarian leadership among other basic values. Constitutional Law teachers
should not be neutral regarding such principles. It is, of course, easier to criticize
the behavior of judicial and political actors from earlier centuries. The racist
views Chief Justice Roger Taney or Justice Henry Billings Brown expressed, the
Japanese internment order of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s government, the
demagogic behavior of Senator Joe McCarthy, and the oath violations of Richard
M. Nixon all present more comfortable targets since the wrong-doers are long
deceased and not subjects of contemporary controversy.
Yet unconstitutional behavior should not be immune from criticism simply
because associated with one who, until recently was president of the United
States. As educators, professors may choose to handle these matters differently,
depending on their individual styles, the schools and locations where they teach,
their perception of their students’ views, and their assessment of the most
effective way to present the material or the way that best fits their style.
Information should be fairly presented and alternative viewpoints received.
There may be times when Socratic questioning rather than professorial
pronouncements are the most appropriate ways to proceed. Hypotheticals can
also be used imagining behavior by other presidents, including Trump’s
predecessor or successor or some future, imaginary president of an unspecified
party. Sometimes student questions or comments may bring behavior of Trump
or other presidents into the discussion. Yet Constitutional Law professors should
not ignore constitutional clauses, values, and issues Trump’s behavior raised.
It’s worth emphasizing that the purpose here is not to convert Constitutional
Law class into a partisan forum. That would obviously be inappropriate. But
neither should a rejection of constitutional principle be ignored because the
parties responsible were also partisans. In educating students, Constitutional
Law courses have considered numerous issues relating to behavior of various
presidents during the last half century or more. It is also impossible, or at least
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unwise, for Constitutional Law courses to ignore the Trump presidency as a
historical event or to disregard the cases and clauses, norms and conventions,
and constitutional ideals that his presidency spotlighted and the questions they
raise about the present and future of American constitutional democracy.
III. THE ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS
The role of law schools in educating about constitutional ideals does not end
in the classroom of the basic Constitutional Law courses. There is a larger
obligation to educate the public regarding constitutional ideals. 200 The idea that
law schools might constructively contribute to knowledge about the Constitution
certainly did not begin with the Trump presidency, 201 although that four-year
period of American history highlights the need for the undertaking and suggests
the consequences of a population unschooled in or uncommitted to basic
constitutional principle.
The Constitution is not perfect, something its text and history confirm, and
Constitutional Law courses can and should discuss constitutional imperfections
which have been corrected as well as those that remain. 202 Nonetheless, law
schools rest on the basic premise that the Constitution generally reflects worthy
principles and merits support. A lawyer’s oath of admission to a state bar often
requires that they swear to support the Constitution and that of the state. 203
American law schools surely cannot and should not institutionally engage
in partisan activity, but they should act to provide a fuller public discussion of
the underlying principles and purposes behind the Constitution to benefit
populations other than their students. Most law schools already do so, yet the
recent challenge to basic constitutional principles should exhort them to do
more. There are many ways law schools might contribute to that cause. They
might fulfill that mission by, for instance, providing educational programs about
constitutional principles for the public, lawyers (with Continuing Legal
Education credits where they incentivize attendance), and students, on
Constitution Day and on other occasions. They might create Constitutional Law
Clinics to explore, write, and educate on topics. The Rule of Law Clinic that
Professor Harold Hongju Koh has taught produced very useful guides regarding
presidential inability and presidential impeachment, and various courses at the
Feerick Center for Social Justice at Fordham Law School, taught by former Dean
John D. Feerick and Professor John Rogan, provide other models. Perhaps

200. See, e.g., Nicholas W. Allard, Sweet Are the Uses of Adversity, 52 U. TOL. L. REV. 197,
232–36 (2021) (discussing the role of law schools in public education regarding proper functioning
of government and system of justice).
201. See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Foreword: Public Constitutional Literacy; A Conversation, 90
DENVER L. REV. 825, 825 (2013).
202. U.S. CONST. art. V (providing means of amendment).
203. See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 8.15 (2007).
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student organizations, like the American Constitution Society and the Federalist
Society could collaborate in efforts to discuss to lay audiences some of the
constitutional principles Trump’s presidency raised.
Some schools have made impressive efforts to bring the Constitution to
public school children. Many law schools sponsor Street Law programs in which
law students teach public school students about legal issues relevant to their
lives. 204 Nearly a decade ago, then Professor (now Representative) Jamin B.
Raskin described the Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy Project whereby
law students from eighteen law schools taught a course on the Constitution and
Bill of Rights at area public high schools. 205 Professor Raskin found that the
program inspired and educated both the high school students and the law
student-teachers who received “life-changing benefits” from the experience. 206
At the University of Nebraska, Professor Eric Berger has advised the
Community Legal Education Project (“CLEP”) whereby law school students go
to grade and middle schools (usually fifth and eighth grades) to educate students
about the Constitution. Among their other contributions, programs like these
might provide ways that law schools can interest students from disadvantaged
backgrounds in Constitutional Law, thereby helping address structural barriers
as well as disseminating information about the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Trump’s presidency presents reason to rethink basic Constitutional Law
courses. It will be easiest and most natural to incorporate some materials
regarding clauses or basic questions that Trump’s presidency raised. The more
challenging, yet more important task, is to focus greater attention on
foundational constitutional ideals and their implications and the sort of behavior
that is appropriate for officials and citizens when constitutional principles clash
with their partisan preferences or personal ambitions. If I were teaching a basic
course now, I would certainly devote more class time to exploring such
questions. And that should be an undertaking not simply for Constitutional Law
courses, but for law schools more generally, and one whose audience extends
beyond the students assigned to the course and includes other students, lawyers,
and citizens. Trump’s presidency, including but not limited to the insurrection
of January 6, 2021, has not only provided new material for students to consider

204. See Vicki Jackson, Law Schools and Civic Education, AALS NEWS (Fall 2019),
https://www.aals.org/about/publications/newsletters/aals-news-fall-2019/law-schools-and-civiceducation/.
205. See Jamin B. Raskin, The Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy Project: American
Legal Education’s Ambitious Experiment in Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 DENVER U. L. REV.
833, 833 (2013).
206. Id. at 836.
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but has illustrated the urgent need for public understanding of constitutional
ideals and appropriate behavior.

